G.R. No. L-15939
November 29, 1965
Doctrine
If the deed of donation specifically specified the cause/s whereby the act may be revoked by the donor, the donation is inter vivos.
Facts
Before his death, Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon executed two notarial deeds of donation in favor of respondent. The first deed of donation designated as “donation mortis causa” contains stipulations that:
- donee must bear “all expenses for medical treatment, hospital expenses and/or burial of the Donor”, without limiting the time when such expenses are to be incurred; and
- donor reserved her right “to mortgage or even sell the donated property, when and if she should need funds to meet her own needs.
On the other hand, the second deed of donation which is also designated as “donation mortis causa” expressly provides for and indirectly recognizes the donor’s power to nullify the conveyance to the alleged “donee” whenever the “donor” wished to do so, for any reason or for no particular reason at all.
The heirs of Donor Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon attacked the validity of the donation on the ground that the deed failed to follow the testamentary solemnities considering that it is a donation mortis causa. The lower court held that the two deeds of donations are donations mortis causa, hence, they are void for failure to comply with the testamentary solemnities required by law.
Issue
Whether or not the two deeds of donation are inter vivos or mortis causa.
Ruling
The first deed of donation is a donation inter vivos while the second deed of donation is a donation mortis causa. As a consequence, the first deed of donation is valid even without compliance with the testamentary solemnities. On the other hand, the second deed of donation is void since a donation mortis causa must comply with the testamentary solemnities required by law.
With regards to the first deed of donation, it is considered as donation inter vivos despite being designated as mortis causa because (1) it is not absolutely revocable and (2) it is onerous.
On the first reason, an essential characteristics of disposition mortis causa is that the conveyance or alienation should be (expressly or by necessary implication) *revocable *ad nutum, i e., at the discretion of the grantor or so-called “donor”, simply because the latter has changed his mind. However, the specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos. In this case, while there is a clause that the donor reserved her right “to mortgage or even sell the donated property, when and if she should need funds to meet her own needs”, this last sentence of the stipulation appears incompatible with the grantor’s freedom to revoke a true conveyance mortis causa, which freedom to revoke is essentially absolute and discretionary. If the late donor wished or intended to retain the right to change the destination of her property at her sole will and discretion, there was no reason for her to specify the causes for which she could sell or encumber the property covered by her bounty.
On the second reason, a conveyance for onerous consideration is governed by the rules of contracts and not by those of donation or testament. In this case, conveyance of the properties described in the deed appears made in consideration of the undertaking of the donee-respondent to bear “all expenses for medical treatment, hospital expenses and/or burial of the Donor.”
With regards to the second deed of donation, it is considered a donation mortis causa since donor intended that no proprietary right was intended to pass to the alleged “donee” prior to the donor’s death. Unlike in the first deed of donation, the designation as donation mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that no signs contradict or limit the unqualified and unrestricted right of the donor to alienate the conveyed properties in favor of other persons of her choice at any time that she should wish to do so. It is so expressed in the deed, and it indirectly recognizes the donor’s power to nullify the conveyance to the alleged “donee” whenever the “donor” wished to do so, for any reason or for no particular reason at all.