G.R. No. L-4225
August 25, 1952
Doctrine
In ascertaining the intention of the donor of whether or not the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa, it is the body of the document of donation and the statements contained therein that is controlling.
Facts
Manuela Concepcion executed a deed of donation in favor of Emilia Concepcion. The deed contained the provision “donation mortis causa”. Thereafter, Manuela died and her heirs filed a case for the summary settlement of her estate. Emilia opposed such on the ground that the property donated by Manuela to her was included in the summary settlement case. The lower court ruled that the donation is a donation mortis causa. Moreover, the lower court ruled that since the donation did not comply with the formalities required by the law on wills, such donation is void. Emilia then appealed to the Court of Appeals who then referred the case to the SC since the controversy involves questions of law.
An excerpt from the deed is shown below:
“Yo, Manuela Concepcion, mayor de edad, viuda, Filipina, con residencia y direccion postal en el municipio de San Antonio, provincia de Zambales, Filipinas, hago constar que, en consideracion a los buenos servicios prestados a mi por mi sobrina, Emilia Concepcion, antes y durante estos dias y teniendo, ademas, especial predileccion por sus buenas cualidades y el cariño que tengo de ella, en quien cifro un porvenir provechoso, por la presente declaro que hago DONACION MORTIS CAUSA a favor de mi citada sobrina, Emilia Concepcion, sujeta a las condiciones que mas abajo se especifican, de las siguientes propiedades que se describen a continuacion, a saber: xxx”
Issue
Whether or not the donation is mortis causa or inter vivos.
Ruling
The donation is one inter vivos.
It is the body of the document of donation and the statements contained therein, and not the title that should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor. Here, the donation is entitled and called donacion onerosa mortis causa. From the body, however, the Court find that the donation was of a nature remunerative rather than onerous. It was for past services rendered, services which may not be considered as a debt to be paid by the donee but services rendered to her freely and in goodwill. The donation instead of being onerous or for a valuable consideration, as in payment of a legal obligation, was more of remuneratory or compensatory nature, besides being partly motivated by affection.
If a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. In the present case, it was held that the donor or rather the person who drafted the deed, in using the phrase “mortis causa” and in providing that the donation should take effect only after the donor’s death simply meant that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the properties donated should take effect only after the donor’s death and not before.
Hence, the donation is donation inter vivos and not mortis causa.