G.R. No. 155450
August 6, 2008
Facts
On June 2, 1930, the CFI issued Decree No. 381928 in favor of respondent’s predecessor-in-interest – spouses Carag. Pursuant to the said decree, OCT No. 11585 was issued to spouses Carag.
On July 2, 1952, the OCT was cancelled in order to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued: one was issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B while another one was issued in the name of the private respondents, covering Lot 2472-A.
On May 19, 1994, de Dayag and others filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property because the latter was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of said decree.
Later on, the investigating team of the DENR reported that the property covered by the decree is still a timberland at the time of its issuance. It was only in 22 February 1982 that portion of the said lot was classified as alienable and disposable.
Thereafter, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. Moreover, petitioner argued that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the power to declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner’s complaint. Hence, this petition.
Issue
Whether the then Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Carag.
Held
Yes. It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been declared alienable or disposable. However, lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law are not covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 of Act No. 2874.
This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for public purpose in accordance with law. Thus, for lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8, trial courts has jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. In other words, under the Spanish regime, all crown lands were per se alienable and subject to adjudication by the Courts.
In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion has been declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The finality of the trial court’s decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution. Even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were “subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.”
Hence, the trial court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Carag. Petition is DENIED.