Quinto and Tolentino v. COMELEC Case Digest

Posted

G.R. No. 189698
February 22, 2010

Facts

This case arise from the assailed Decision of this Court which declared as unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code 3 and Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678. The mentioned provisions were declared unconstitutional on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from over breadth. The said provisions unduly discriminates against appointive officials since they are deemed to have resigned from office upon filing of Certificate of Candidacy whereas elective officials are not.

Incumbent Appointive Official. — Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Incumbent Elected Official. — Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are running, an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat.

Issue

Whether or not the assailed provisions violated the equal protection clause?

Held

No. The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

There are material and significant distinctions between the two classes of officials.

  • The elective official occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
  • Under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote whereas elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

Moreover, the dichotomous treatment of appointive and elective officials is germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.

Hence, the assailed provisions are constitutional. The Court reversed its former decision which declared the assailed provisions unconstitutional.

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Categories Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence