G.R. No. 127820
July 20, 1998
Facts
The Municipality of Parañaque issued Resolution No. 93-95 which caused the institution of complaint for expropriation over the lands of respondent for the purpose of providing socialized housing projects. The trial court issue an Order authorizing petitioner to take possession of the property upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 15% of the FMV based on the tax declaration. Thereafter, respondent alleged that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Then, the trial court nullified its first Order and dismissed the case. The trial court decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case “substantially complies with the requirements of the law” because the terms “ordinance” and “resolution” are synonymous for “the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Issues
- Whether or not a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action?
- Whether or not the principle of res judicata will bar the exercise of the State of the power of eminent domain?
Held
First Issue
No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. Section 19 of RA 7160 lays down the following essential requisites before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
- An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
- The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
- There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
- A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor exercising the right to eminent domain be authorized through an ordinance.
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently — a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.
Second Issue
No. The principle of res judicata, cannot bar the absolute right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property or exercise the power of eminent domain. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can “reach every form of property which the State might need for public use. Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement.
In this case, Our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through a mere resolution will not bar it from re-instituting similar proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all others are properly complied with.
Decision
Therefore, petition is denied.