G.R. No. 176033
March 11, 2015
Case Principle
The 60-day period of suspension that is allowed for arraignment CANNOT be relaxed. Hence, after the expiration of the 60-day period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
Facts
An Information charging petitioners with estafa was filed before the Regional Trial Court on July 16, 2003.
On August 4, 2003, petitioners jointly filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. They asserted, that no deceit or false pretenses was committed because private respondents were fully aware that she does not own the pledged motor vehicles.
Pending the resolution of the motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of Arraignment on August 9, 2003. Upon the prosecution’s motion, the public respondent ordered the case archived pending resolution of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration with the OCP of Manila. Later on, the OCP of Manila filed a Motion to Set Case for Trial, considering that petitioners’ motions for reconsideration and for withdrawal of the information have already been denied for lack of merit. With that, the public respondent issued an Order dated March 15, 2004 directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest against petitioner and the setting of the case for arraignment. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a petition for review before the DOJ, questioning the denial of his motion for reconsideration. Hence, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Arraignment and Suspend Further Proceedings, until their petition for review before the DOJ is resolved with finality. The motion was granted.
On June 23, 2004, De Castro filed a Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest. The motion was granted on May 16, 2005. Thereafter, the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest which was denied. In denying the motion, the respondent provides that the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (or Rules of Court) allows only a 60-day period of suspension of arraignment. Petitioners appealed to the CA who denied their petition. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners argue that the provision of Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for arraignment to only sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus, it cannot deprive petitioners of their procedural right to due process, as their petition for review has not yet been resolved by the DOJ.
Issue
Whether or not the 60-day period of suspension that is allowed for arraignment may be relaxed.
Held
No.
While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, Section 11, Rule 116 of the RRCP limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. Therefore, after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
Even if rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
In this case, the period of one year and one month from April 16, 2004 to May 16, 2005, when the public respondent ordered the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of petitioner, was more than ample time to give the petitioners the opportunity to obtain a resolution of their petition for review from the DOJ. The petitioners though submitted a Certification from the DOJ dated May 30, 2005 stating that their petition for review is pending resolution by the Department as of May 27, 2005. However, such delay in the resolution does not extend the period of 60 days prescribed under the afore-quoted Section 11©, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Hence, the 60-day period of suspension that is allowed for arraignment CANNOT be relaxed.