G.R. No. L-62100
May 30, 1986.
Doctrine
A person admitted to bail can be restricted from exercising his right to travel, except when he has sufficiently shown that there is an urgent necessity to travel.
Facts
Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted a bail bond. Thereafter, he filed a “motion for permission to leave the country” stating as a ground his desire to go to the United States relative to his business transactions and opportunities. The RTC, CA, and SC dismissed the motion.
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Issue
Whether or not the petitioner should be granted the right to travel.
Held
No. The right to travel is not an absolute right as it can be impaired upon the lawful order of the court. The order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the Constitution.
Court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
In a bail bond, the custody of and full authority to the accused is transferred to the sureties. If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter.
Also, petitioner’s case is not on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused was able to show the urgent necessity for her travel abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her sureties to the proposed travel thereby satisfying the court that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond. In contrast, petitioner in this case has not satisfactorily shown any of the above. Petitioner’s ‘Motion for Permission to Leave the Country’ will show that it is solely predicated on petitioner’s wish to travel to the United States where he will, allegedly attend to some business transactions and search for business opportunities. From the tenor and import of petitioner’s motion, no urgent or compelling reason can be discerned to justify the grant of judicial imprimatur thereto. Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that there is absolute necessity for him to travel abroad. Petitioner’s motion bears no indication that the alleged business transactions could not be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Neither is there any hint that petitioner’s absence from the United States would absolutely preclude him from taking advantage of business opportunities therein, nor is there any showing that petitioner’s non-presence in the United States would cause him irreparable damage or prejudice. Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed to it. Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash indemnities.
Therefore, the petitioner is validly prevented from exercising his right to travel.